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Diagram for a possible "tweak"
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John Smith

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Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« on: June 13, 2015, 04:40:48 am »

Please don't be upset, I want y'all to succeed more than you do :)

I am able to draw up my small change to properly articulate what I am suggesting. Of course I am still not sure I understand the white paper but for as many times as I could read it this is the best I do.  What I am wondering is if your project fits into something that could possibly become this:



Because if it does then I think you have a full solution to something slightly bigger than you meant to solve and mean to implement.
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #1 on: June 15, 2015, 09:04:53 pm »

Here is my understanding behind the philosophy of the economics. Perhaps my view coincides with this project or perhaps it does not. Maybe it is useful or not and maybe peoples have their own opinions or corrections on how I understand this evolution:

The Future Model for Poker Sites

Poker players need a profitable game in order to secure the integrity of it. Having a profitable game to a certain extent and beyond, arises the inevitability that “malicious players” will use bots for maximum profits. These bots will be maximally scaled for maximum profits for the malicious player/party that sets up the bots.

This is not unlike today’s massive stables run by large staking entities. A new game like “spin n go” arises and stakers/coaches seek to exploit the profits and change to the maximum degree. Just like large staking groups, bots will inevitably bring the profitability of the game down to a certain level. Any solution to the technical flaws or economic systems of the game should take both these phenomenon into account.

Profitability IS Security

There are a few major complaints that have been growing in the consciousness of the collective players over time.  Software advantages are often discussed by players as something that gives certain players an unfair edge over others.  This is much like another issue that is becoming more and more a reality-bots.  These two issues are also very inter-related with the possibilities of collusion amongst players or bots. However these issues should not be the TRUE concern in the eyes of the individual or the collective player.  Truly the only issue that matters here is the profitability. If a certain game is profitable for the individual, and especially more profitable than today’s current equivalent, then why should this player care if there is any human players at all?!

Private Games are the Future of Poker


In the diagram of decentralized serverless poker, there is a distinction made between private games and public games.  Private games simply require an invite of some sort and public games are more of the wild west with randomized seating.  Randomized seating solves the problem of collusion PROVIDED one party doesn’t hold a major economic majority of the entire field.  Although unlikely such a situation could be solved further, much like bitcoin’s 51% attack, by decentralizing the major bot/staking pools that might arise.  There is a basic formula here, an equation to see and to balance, in how profitable a game might be, in relation to n pools of bots/staking groups.

Bots (and Players) as Nodes

The basic change from the present model to a conceived future model is that players are to act as nodes to hold up the integrity of the network rather than the traditional centralized server model nearly all sites use today.  Players essentially are then able to set up and cryptographically deal/verify their own games rather than using the more expensive traditional model of “contracting” third party trust for such verification.  The new model elects random jury’s from the entire pool to verify different aspects of the entire system.  PROVIDED, the majority of the jury pool isn’t owned by a single entity, such a method can be theoretically secure.

Once again this highlights the need for a decentralized field as describe previously.

The Future Model of Sites

Provided this P2P layer exists much of the existing overhead disappears from site models. There is still much need for attracting types of player pools.  There may still be a need for other types of security solutions, however, these solutions can now be more tailored, less costly, and have the advantage of a more rapid evolution since the entry to implementation will be so much lower.

Incentivizing Bots and Malicious Entities to Cooperate

Now we have an economy in which there can be brought about an equilibrium that might prove favorable for the future of poker. Since bots can be used as verification nodes that hold up the integrity of the games (ie cryptographic dealing), it makes economic sense to use them for these purposes rather than expensive third party solutions.  On the other hand such nodes will not cooperate or participate without the proper compensation. Truly it matters not (in this context) these bots/node earn this compensation through actual gameplay, rakeback, direct payments, or shares/crypto-coin etc. This suggests there IS a great equilibrium to be found. The bots require a certain profit to verify the private game pool, and such a profit can be realized through a system equivalent to today’s rake/rakeback systems.

The Importance of Effective Rake as a Metric and Free Market Competition

The concept of Effective Rake plays an important but hidden role here.  Because bots can certainly act as nodes, and will also necessarily be the most profitable players in the public games AND if much of the “kick back” from private games could be paid back through a type of rakeback program, there is now levated the possibility of an effective rake standard for the public games. This entire system assumes (and indeed theoretically provides!) a certain context of free market competition where the verification nodes/bots “out-bid” each other to offer the most cost efficient solution (this suggests a lower consumer price because of such competition between node pools).

What is important to note is the effective rake becomes defined as the market equilibrium and thus is a product of competing forces rather than an actual metric to be “predicated” and then achieved through “policy”.

Isn’t Ideal Poker “Rake-Less”?

Truly the future of poker is to involve a great change in perception and also the intelligence and direction in which the entire collective of the poker community might function. This “function”, is and will be seen as, truly a product of the nature of rake.  When rake is allowed to be high, we will see a very perturbed society, that is not very interested in the inner workings (and macro) of the economics of the game. As rake asymptotically slides towards zero, we will expect to see a greater and greater change in this context.  As life gets breathed into the game, so too will it attract the intelligent and creative minds that gave it its first successive generations of booms.  The system described here, is both the catalyst a ultimately symptom of the beginning of the realization and implementation of such a change.

Ideal Poker IS rakeless from the players perspective. Ideal-ness one can note, is also conceptual and theoretical.  What we propose is to begin to define such an ideal and (only then can we) begin to move in that direction.
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #2 on: June 20, 2015, 04:25:36 pm »

Just another thought that might be even more relevant, and might lead to me understanding Pokereum even better.  A friend made a suggestion about giving the network incentive to the losing players.  This made me think, and I think I understand the Pokereum model better. But this lead me to some interesting thoughts that might either sort of cancel out and leave the Pokereum model or MIGHT bridge all three perspectives.  Just some loose thoughts, I'm trying to have any discussion anywhere with any interested peoples:

Quote
We give power of the network to the losing players. This is actual quite interesting and as I understand it NOT Pokereum’s solution.

Interesting thoughts arise…and we start to wonder if that could possibly be the solution WITHOUT any sort of system of public/private tables etc.

We think about a certain malicious party trying to lose enough money to take over the network…impossible or favorable for the players in the long run, in order to secure a network that will lose its integrity ultimately anyways.

A malicious party losing to only its own accounts cannot be a very net loser.

We can also think about possibilities for bots and bot pools to arise that are “losing players” on average, but receive enough supplemental private game rake (in exchange for acting as a random node) that being a slight loser plus the additional control of the network might be enough secure and equilibrium.

A winning bot must necessarily PAY for some control of the network.

A losing player gets a piece of the network and they can sell it.

You want your poker network/stake to grow or shrink in relation to “domestic deposits” or “lost monies”.

The incentive to own stake in the network can be collecting “rake” by acting as juror for private games.

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innovator256

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #3 on: June 25, 2015, 02:09:13 am »

"Invite only" is another option other than randomized table stake category based - bonding  access, bots have nothing to do with jury pools specifically, every ones node has the potential to be a "bonded-juror" cross verified by ethereum smartcontract challenge responses to other potential candidates or juror standing a chance to snatch your bond if your signed data is fraudulent. Reward good citizens and punish bad ones, further tainting the reputations

Rake is paid to a smart contract..Smart contract automatically distribute stored "net value" (profits) to token locations

Rake will always be necessary for the backing, maintenance and support of the p2p network...

Rake is ultra competitive, but high "net value" still based on volume and expected. Part of rake is reward to the most active /honest in the network in several categories, this includes losers as well.

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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #4 on: June 26, 2015, 01:06:26 am »

"Invite only" is another option other than randomized table stake category based - bonding  access, bots have nothing to do with jury pools specifically, every ones node has the potential to be a "bonded-juror" cross verified by ethereum smartcontract challenge responses to other potential candidates or juror standing a chance to snatch your bond if your signed data is fraudulent. Reward good citizens and punish bad ones, further tainting the reputations

Rake is paid to a smart contract..Smart contract automatically distribute stored "net value" (profits) to token locations

Rake will always be necessary for the backing, maintenance and support of the p2p network...

Rake is ultra competitive, but high "net value" still based on volume and expected. Part of rake is reward to the most active /honest in the network in several categories, this includes losers as well.
I THINK I understand this, it is truly difficult to know for sure.  Basically this answers my main question:
Quote
The software is not a site, its p2p software there fore the players are pseudonymous at best...also one of the multi heuristic strategies in the software limit the potential of collusion is pseudonymous player shuffling, so its pretty mush impossible to tell who is who even your friend you were sitting next to in the previous hand, except at private table.
So private tables as a functionality can exist.

My diagram isn't really a "tweak" in your design, but rather my perception, from the player's perspective, of what a possible outcome of this project COULD look like. From what I understand with the possibility of private games, the economy I describe IS relevant and somewhat possible with pokererum. Keeping in mind your endevour here is to create a working p2p poker network (ie a decentralized poker client), whereas much of my perspective and writing has been philosophizing about an ENTIRELY decentralized poker economy. 

Yours is a noble first step where is mine is only some form of a theoretical ideal that may or may not eventually come to exist.

Anyways, then I think I have a perfect question that is both appropriate and not disruptive, yet relevant and helpful.  What will the rake be?  And rather than the "%" I mean to ask who will decide this and how will it be decided?  I do understand "rake" is a necessary part of any such project but I would add we should expect rake or the cost of providing d-poker to decrease over time (naturally?). 

Rake to me should be set by a market mechanism, but that might again be beyond the scope of a decentralized poker client, yet no doubt this project could set a very low (favorable for players) standard that is very competitive vs any centralized model (you allude to this as well).  I have written about this, but I am interested in hearing about this projects ideas (also to see if I have any useful thoughts on the subject). 

« Last Edit: June 26, 2015, 01:22:35 am by John Smith »
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innovator256

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #5 on: June 26, 2015, 04:10:17 pm »

Good question. At the moment, as with other organizational driven objectives, it is up to the DAO as a whole ( all token holders/ majority) , but to the delegates by default (if no issues are raised) to vote on what the appropriate rake percentage that is both ultra-competitive and also high value returns to tokens. Voting on proposals can happen after any knowledgeable delegates, sub committees or regular members have provided expert analysis of the market and a set of options that is optimal. In essence the DAO is proposal driven, so you need a threshold number of tokens to start proposals of different types....every vote outcome is carried out by the suggested executor/s of the proposal...those of technical nature default to devs

Ultra competitively low rake to players is the goal of the project

zero rake is impossible, because no backers (DAO) or any other organization structure will care. Its like having bitcoin without the mining reward, you are doomed to fail from the get go.

Alternatively some kind of market mechanism that determines what efficiently adequate rake percentage is something I have not thought of...It might be a good Idea...
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #6 on: June 28, 2015, 04:38:17 pm »

zero rake is impossible, because no backers (DAO) or any other organization structure will care. Its like having bitcoin without the mining reward, you are doomed to fail from the get go.

Alternatively some kind of market mechanism that determines what efficiently adequate rake percentage is something I have not thought of...It might be a good Idea...
The entire diagram (whether my perspective or "pokereums") IS the market mechanism, but of course only depending on how things are set up. Ideally here we want is something akin to this:
Quote
...a free market for competition with respect to the private tables, which can then evolve freely to deal with security measures of the fields.  This should be held up in some sense by a free market for the evolution of bot/node farms from the wild wild west games.  If the wild west is not profitable enough for bots then fees could be paid (from highly profitable private games) like a form of rake back.  If the wild west is not profitable enough for humans, then no humans would play and so bots could not profit, therefore they would necessarily dial down the winrates for bots (ie make the game more profitable for humans).

Colluding pools of bots in the wild west becomes insignificant because the only useful pool worth paying fees/rake to (or playing in) is a trustworthy one. If we can look at the economics of the games from this perspective I think that it becomes very comparable to bitcoin's markets with respect to mining if we think of the "poker puzzle" as the proof of work.

I think all this is quite a relevant perspective although I do realize pokereum might work a little different than I envision with the diagram, it IS important to understand how all this would work and look from the players perspective.  I just want to see what kind of a response this gets and I do have some insight in relation to how this would work with respect to  the current centralized model or other projects. 

Rake MUST be paid high enough to cover the cost of providing the network (which includes hardware and devs etc.) and hopefully absolutely no more than the perfect amount of incentive (profit/income).  To do this there must then be a free market for competition of offers from the private tables to pay juror's a competitive fee in exchange for a competitive product (security). 

It's true no one can expect "no rake", but if the system is locked into this form then non-cooperation fuels a lower cost to provide the game. 

Bringing devs/Dao into the picture for their income can be done in the same manner (Pokererum has its plans obviously), with the only caveat being that the more peoples that aren't actually players or the most "significant players' who make decision for the future of the game, the less "decentralized" we might consider it.  One would want to structure that aspect to phase out non-players, and phase in long time winning humans, as they have the biggest concerns for the long term profitability and sustainability mixed with the historical traditions of the games.

I'm going to separate this post from the next...
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #7 on: June 28, 2015, 04:50:29 pm »

The reason I bring this all up has much to do with the implementation and application of "pokerereum" (or any such project), to the actual existing ipoker economy today. And this is very relevant to bitcoin and the lecture series ideal money, when thinking about what a basis for measurement would do to an existing market that has none.

At first it might not seem completely relevant or comparable, but as we begin to play with different ideas of what rake might be, what profitability of the game might be, and what the make up of the fields is going to be like (how difficult the average table will be to play at), we might start to understand that a poker site's value in regards to "chips" and from the player's perspective, FLUCTUATES, depending on these and other parameters.

Pokererum would be in a unique position IF it offered a software of similar quality but also a game that is more profitable to the average player (this COULD be lower rake but it could also be because of a weaker player field!).  But of course this is also dependent on the existing players incentive to break the mental barrier and barrier to entry (ie switching from poker stars to pokerereum). 

A players willingness (or unwillingess) to switch sites or to start playing poker on pokererum is very related to how easily they can evaluate the rake or effective rake on a site.  In other words the easiness to switch (ie not having to give ID, or send bank info) is augmented greatly by having an evaluation mechanism with respect to profitability of the field.

Truly a RAKE-O-METER would be the ultimate catalyst here.  However most people aren't interested in this because they don't understand how that could be possible.  But this is exactly what we are not understanding that bitcoin (when it is fully initiated) is for our global economy with respect to different currencies.

Pokererums rake mechanism, as a function of its market, COULD be set to create such a standard which becomes a sort of bedrock or beacon for the entire ipoker economy, and in this it would allow all players from all sites to evaluate the profitability of their own game. At first this is a very very loose and difficult approximation which is exactly what has been happening in the global economy today. But as macro shifts are made, and big changes happen, different banks and currencies have been forced to rein in their arbitrary monetary policies. What is significant about this is as these "polices" start their asymptotic descent towards zero, the markets get more and more accurate and more and more intelligent (ie larger "gravitational" force and/or super increased liquidity).

This is what you have potential to release, and truly I don't think there is much need for any change in your project.  I do think though I have some relevant philosophical observations in regards to how this might, or how this could play out.

I hope this was somewhat more understandable than in the past.  I hope peoples understand why this is seemingly not relevant but actually is.

I'll leave some relevant links that no one needs to read but they are here for thought.
« Last Edit: June 28, 2015, 06:51:25 pm by John Smith »
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #9 on: September 15, 2015, 05:31:52 am »

I still wonder if LC's aren't a viable option for dpoker: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3l0082/extending_the_philosophy_of_lightning_channels_to/

P2P Poker at Lightning Network Speed Without Blockchain Encumbrance

There may be a slick way of implementing mental poker via LC’s that does not (necessarily!) need an ultra-fast block-chain. Lighting Channel’s also provide a fault-tolerance required for the implementation of mental poker’s gameplay. The key to implementing this extension as well as the (justified) assumption here is that each player is securely issued hole cards via mental poker protocol. These hole cards become part of the secret needed for proof of participation/decision and are also used claim any refunded equity in case of any type of lack of protocol co-operation.

One Simple Protocol/Game-rule Change

The simple addition to the lightning channel proposal is that anytime there is “funny-business” or for example if a player drops-out, or wont validate another players move etc, all of the equity in the pot is paid out via the equity in each players hand (in regards to any streets that are or aren’t revealed). In other words, anytime time players are upset and want a ruling from the floor, the floor always demands all active players reveal their cards, and the pot is divided in relation to the equity each player holds.

Poker is Text-Based Turn Play

If we think of a poker hand, similar to a complex transaction (ie contract), there is some comparability to text based turn play games. In fact a poker hand history is exactly that, a .txt.file that can be read by either or both a computer or a human. The basic point to be made here is that turns can be “crypto-grapically sealed” by the announcement of the next players decision. We can think of this simply as each player upon announcing their decision states “because you did X, I will now do Y. So there are really only two decisions we are concerned with: the very decisions to be made and the last decision made before it (ie. the decisions made before these are already verified since the game continued beyond them).

So if we are on the turn, and no one has contested the flop decisions, we can be sure everything written in the flop history was fair and trust-able for all parties concerned.

The House Always Agrees/Rules with the Equity


This leaves us with a scenario in which a villain, facing an action that is not favorable to them, can drop-out of the game, causing the equity to dump in regards to the hole cards and the board. If they don’t reveal their cards, they don’t get any equity (which is normal in poker), if they do reveal their cards they get the equity from the last line agree upon and they lose any penalty or reputation they might incur or have.

How to Disincentivize Renegers

All player’s still suffer in reputation from the renege, a la having the HH written in the block-chain, but in randomized seating/zoom Poker, habitual renegers are going to have a higher reneg score than those that don’t.
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John Smith

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Re: Diagram for a possible "tweak"
« Reply #10 on: September 16, 2015, 05:02:48 pm »

I post this here because there must be some creative thinkers on this subject here and it would be nice to eventually bounce thoughts around
Quote
In regards to extending lightning channel’s to the philosophy of p2p poker we are left with the problem of disencentiving habitual “floor callers”, that is the peoples that choose to run the equity of their hand and not adhere to the game flow.

So there is then incentive for them, especially considering variance, to make this move in certain spots, and so the punishment, in some form or another simply needs to equal this incentive (or be worse).

In live poker we might see how this could be solved, where someone is calling the floor excessively, then the Casino might not let that person back, might give them a waiting period, might take away some floor calling privileges, might charge a tax/rake/fee or penalty and so on.

Further more and in regards to that, we might choose a centralized authority, which itself could be either minimized or better yet divided into many decentralized (competing) authorities.

But it might also be solvable on its own by algorithm.

If a player pool has an average of spots in which the floor is called, it might be possible to track each players # of times they call (as a frequency vs time).

We can think of a simple tiered system in which those that are involved in “floor calling” move down a spot, thus pushing up less controversial players on average.

It can be made either costly and/or time consuming to move up in a tier from various ways such as rake, fees, points accumulated, shares, etc.

Some form of finite accounts or finite seats/tables, could be used to create a value that is desired to not be destroyed.
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