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Nxt General Discussion / Re: Price speculation
« on: February 11, 2018, 12:32:27 am »... when Come-From-Beyond and BCNext were running the show ...
this "and" sounds interesting

Latest Stable Nxt Client: Nxt 1.12.2
... when Come-From-Beyond and BCNext were running the show ...
Спасибо!http://www.ledgerjournal.org/ojs/index.php/ledger/issue/view/2/showTocCongratulations with the publication in the 1st editoin of Ledger Journal, Serguei!
HI, you should update the opening post to make obvious that the Jinn to Iota exchange is finished .See https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1262688.msg13605469#msg13605469
Yesterday, I did send Jinn to the NXT address and entered the iota address in http://collect.iotatoken.com/ . I had no message on the way saying that the collect is finished.
What is going to happen to my Jinn token ? Will they be changed into iota or refund to my NXT account ? ( nxt account : NXT-J6BE-JL6S-EY39-F7PMD )
Nicolas
As kushti observed just above, in the current situation the forger may delay a block a little to influence the BT adjustment. Since currently the BT can change a lot (two times!) in just one step, every possibility to play with it can be considered a danger. With the new algorithm delaying one block makes a very small effect on the BT, because of the averaging.Anyhow, in a week or so the BT adjustment algorithm will change, and it will become virtually impossible to play games with it.
Hi, could you please clarify why the new adjustment algorithm makes grinding impossible? The only improvement I see is that BT is not adjusted every block. It is adjusted every 2 blocks, so indeed an improvement, but not really impossible I think. Most probably I don't understand something. Thanks.
Not necessarily single account, but maybe a collusion of several big holders. Anyhow, that's all speculations, for now.OK, assume R=16, l=10, for definiteness. Imagine that there there is someone who controls, say, 10% of the stake (or, maybe, several big holders collude so that they do control 10%). Assume also that other accounts are not so big, say, each controls less than 0.1%. Then, the 10% holder would be able to forge really a lot of blocks in a row, by dividing his stake into 100 equal parts (with overwhelming probability at least one of his accounts gets the maximal m=R).
What do you think of this attack? In general, the situation that many small holders cannot forge anything together is worrying, I think...
I'll check both IPoS / Nxt against that, but intuitively, in this case a system is probably vulnerable. I don't worry much about such a scenario though. Economy is about Pareto distribution of wealth. Paper ( http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3892 ) shows the Bitcoin is about stretched exponential distribution. I can't imagine a system with a single 10+% account and others hold < 0.1%.
As a side note, I don't understand why you write "However, it is possible to iterate over delta" when discussing the Nxt algorithm on p.3. Delta is in the right-hand side of (2), which is monotone, and it is not hashed. What advantage could it bring to the attacker then?
OK, assume R=16, l=10, for definiteness. Imagine that there there is someone who controls, say, 10% of the stake (or, maybe, several big holders collude so that they do control 10%). Assume also that other accounts are not so big, say, each controls less than 0.1%. Then, the 10% holder would be able to forge really a lot of blocks in a row, by dividing his stake into 100 equal parts (with overwhelming probability at least one of his accounts gets the maximal m=R).
Yes, small-stake accounts as well as big stakeholder generate a disproportionally low number of tickets. So for a big stakeholder, aside of attacks, there's the economic incentive to split stake into middle-class accounts.
For attack with stake-splitting, now best number of accounts for 33% stakeholder is about 180(R=16, l=10)(old number with b^m was about 96). Bigger swarm reduces chances to generate a better chain than network's.
Well, even with R=8 there is a big problem with the "hidden chain" attack performed by the guy with max balance. Assume, for example, that the richest guy has 5% of the stake, and others less than 1%. Then, even if he forges alone, he'll get sometimes very heavy weights (5⁸=390625), one his block will easily overweight a very long blockchain created by all others.
Oh, that's true. I've fixed ticket's score formula with m * log2 b. Happily, simulations show the updated formula works better against attacks, so adversarial power IPoS is claimed to be safe against is raised to 1/3(33.33%). I've added you to Acknowledgement sectionUploading fixed paper to the Arxiv...
And what value of R you're thinking of? 16, as in the paper?I'm through the paper; but let me first ask the following to remove any doubt: do you really mean that the score of a ticket is b^m (b to power m), and not simply bm? I thought it was a misprint, but it happens two times, on pp. 4 and 5...
Alright, b^m (b to power m). I also tried b*(m^k), with k=8 seems more or less ok. With k=1, big stakeholders have too much advantage.
http://pastebin.com/XrUieiJqNo.
it's official list??